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THE HELLENISTIC AND ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE TRADITION OF ARISTOTLE IN THE WEST

RICHARD MCKEON

INTELLECTUAL HISTORY is conceived and written in reverse: it accounts for the historian's present-day conception of past ideas in a history in which past conceptions of those ideas, expressed by philosophers, historians, and scholars, are incidental and, usually, mistaken. The influence of Aristotle's philosophy is universally acknowledged, but "the philosophy of Aristotle" with which the history of his influence is presumed to begin is a construction produced in the long history of philosophical research and debated in the multiple contemporary currents of philosophical teaching. It differs in form and content from what was expounded and interpreted by earlier scholars and historians of philosophy. Indeed the history of the influence of Aristotle which takes its beginning in the philosophy of Aristotle is inseparable from the history of the formation of the philosophy of Aristotle which provides grounds of the statement of that philosophy. This is particularly true of the first thousand years of the formation of the tradition of Aristotle in the West, from 322 B.C., when Aristotle died, his works completed, to the sixth century A.D. when Boethius made available to later philosophers, who only occasionally had access to Greek texts and commentaries, Latin translations of two or possibly three of the six parts of Aristotle's *Organon*. The conception of Aristotle's philosophy formed on that basis continued to be dominant even after the works of Aristotle were translated in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and continued to give the interpretation of Aristotle a variety of Platonizing tinges even after critical editions of his works, and of Greek, Arabic, and Latin commentaries on them, appeared in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Changes in the nature and conception of philosophy reflect changes in the modes in which philosophy was pursued during the first thousand years of the formation and influence of Aristotle's philosophy. In the Hellenic period, philosophy consisted of inquiry and discussion, oral or written, in expositions or dialogues. Recording other positions, past or present, that is, history, was part of both

modes of philosophizing. In the Hellenistic period, philosophy moved into schools and libraries and became scholastic and scholarly. The schools interpreted doctrines and methods, and the libraries edited books and classified the branches of knowledge and letters. The history of philosophy became records of the opinions of philosophers and the successions of schools, or histories of sciences and arts. Aristotelianism was formed among the Hellenistic schools of philosophy, and members of the Peripatetic school wrote the first histories of science. Aristotle's works were not needed in either enterprise. His books were preserved, lost, forgotten, and emended, and editors determined their authenticity, contents, structure, and order. In the period of the Roman Empire, philosophy was rejoined to rhetoric, dialectic, and sophistic. It was the period of the Second Sophistic, during which political and forensic rhetoric declined, the Platonic dialectic of dialogues and Ideas was transformed into the Neoplatonic dialectic of hierarchies and the One, and Sophistic assumed therapeutic functions in conjunction with medicine, and theatrical and mass-educational functions as epideictic rhetoric. The works of Aristotle were epitomized and interpreted, and Aristotelian words and ideas entered into the formation of a new organization of the liberal arts, a new transcendental theology, and new forms of literature and literary criticism.

The Hellenistic period was a period of erudite accumulation and popular diffusion of knowledge. Philosophy and letters moved from their centralization in Athens to the cities of the Hellenistic kingdoms of Europe, Asia Minor, and Africa. Great libraries were established in Alexandria and Pergamon, where scholarship was developed under the influence of librarians who were philosophers, editors, scientists, and encyclopedists, and schools of philosophy developed in oppositions and successions. Instruments of observation and measurement were developed in the Museum of the Alexandrian Library and were used in initiating empirical, applied, and technological branches of science. The pursuit of philosophy became interpretation of opinions of philosophers and adherence to schools of philosophy.

The philosophy of Aristotle was interpreted and developed differently in two Hellenistic schools of philosophy. Aristotle had been a member of the Academy for twenty years, and he continued to be treated as an Academic in the succession of Academies which forms the history of the Academy under its successive heads. After he left the Academy, he founded the Lyceum, in which the philosophy of

Aristotle followed a different history of development and influence. The two histories reflect the form and manner in which Plato and Aristotle treat the philosophies of other philosophers. Philosophers and disciples of philosophers present their philosophies in Plato's dialogues. The treatises of Aristotle often begin with a review of the positions of earlier philosophers on the problems to be treated in a science, and in the course of the inquiry in the treatise new problems are often introduced with like sketches of the earlier positions and the difficulties or blocks (*aporia*) which they encounter.

The history of the Academy is a history of attitudes towards doctrines, not a history of systems of doctrines. It is a history of forms of dialectic and of their uses. It runs through a series of Academies, sometimes numbered three, sometimes five. Early interpreters of Plato differed concerning whether he expounded his doctrines or philosophy, or simply presented ways in which philosophers discussed doctrines or philosophy. The Old Academy of Speusippus and Xenocrates undertook to identify and state the doctrines of Plato. The New Academy of Arcesilas returned, in opposition to the Stoic dogmatic version of Plato's dialectic, to the method of Socrates, interpreting it as a skeptical method of refuting all doctrines and of arguing for all doctrines. The third Academy of Carneades turned from skepticism to probabilism, since probable doctrines are sufficient for moral action. Philo, under whom Cicero studied, adapted the skepticism of the New Academy to ethics by attacking false and imparting correct moral opinions, and Antiochus broadened the Old Academy to treat all doctrines, including, among others, the dogmatic doctrines of Mnesarchus the Stoic and Philo the Skeptic who had been his masters. In this succession of philosophy Aristotle was an Academic, and his philosophy differed only verbally from the philosophy of the Stoics.

The history of the Lyceum is a history of sciences and of the development and use of scientific methods, not a history of the agreement and differences of schools of philosophy. Aristotle places the scientific methods which he developed midway between the dialectical method of Plato and the physical method of Democritus and calls it the "true physical method" since it is adapted to the phenomena of nature and does not reduce philosophy to a mathematics of either transcendental ideas or separated forms, or underlying simple atoms or elements. The history of the Peripatetic philosophy is a sequence of applications of a scientific method to a variety of problems, which

prepares the way for histories of the sciences and the arts, as contrasted to the history of the Platonic philosophy, which is a series of dialectical methods and their applications and which prepares the way for histories of the opinions of philosophers and of schools of philosophy. The Peripatetic histories do not depend on adherence to Aristotle's doctrines or principles.

Aristotle's immediate successors, Theophrastus and Eudemus, applied Aristotle's method in logic, ethics, psychology, and metaphysics to establish distinctions and positions distinct from those of Aristotle, and Theophrastus supplemented Aristotle's treatises on animals with a treatise on plants and on minerals. A surviving fragment of Theophrastus's *Opinions of Physicists* is a history of empirical theories of sense-perception. Eudemus wrote a history of geometry, arithmetic, and astronomy. Menon's *Iatrika* is a Peripatetic history of medicine. Aristoxenus used Aristotle's problematic method and Pythagorean distinctions in his analysis of music, and he wrote a biography of Pythagoras and a treatise on his opinions. Dicaearchus, a contemporary of Theophrastus, used the method to explore and develop a Pythagorean conception of a corporeal, mortal soul, and Pythagorean precepts of morality and community. He wrote a treatise *On the Soul*, a universal history of culture from the Golden Age to his own time (*Bios Hellados*), a *Constitutions* of Pellene, Corinth, Athens, and Sparta, a *Tripolitikos*, which may have been an exposition of the "mixed" constitution of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, *Lives* of Plato and other philosophers, works on Homer, on music, and a geography of the known world, all of which influenced later research in science and political and literary theory. Strato of Lampsacus, the Physicist, who succeeded Theophrastus as head of the Lyceum, departed from Aristotle's physical theories in several respects, which may show the influence of the atomism of Democritus, as in his arguments for the existence of void in the cosmos. Clearchus of Soli used a like broad erudition to attack luxury and literary ostentation; he wrote paradoxes and erotica, zoological and mystical works, an encomium of Plato, and *Lives* which presented ways of life, not biographies. Critolaus, head of the Lyceum in the second century B.C., seems to have joined Aristotelian and Stoic conceptions, as in his denial that pleasure is a good and in his mingling of Aristotelian cosmology and Stoic materialism in his conception of the soul as composed of the "fifth essence." He criticized rhetoric, argued that it is not an art, but he may have been the source of the report that

Demosthenes learned rhetoric from the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle. It is said that he led the Lyceum back from worldly and rhetorical preoccupations to scientific and philosophical activities. Heads of the Lyceum included men of letters and of affairs, moralists and polymaths, who applied the method of Aristotle to esthetical, technological, practical, and moral affairs.

According to an account in Strabo, repeated and extended by Plutarch, Aristotle's works were unavailable for two centuries after the death of Theophrastus. Theophrastus is said to have bequeathed Aristotle's library and his own to Neleus of Scepsis, who had been a student at the Lyceum, as had his father before him, and who took the books to Asia Minor where his heirs stored them underground in a trench to conceal them lest they be appropriated by the authorities for the Library of Pergamon. They were returned, in poor condition, to Athens and taken as spoils of war to Rome where Tyrannio, a librarian in Cicero's house, worked on them, and Andronicus of Rhodes, the tenth head of the Lyceum, emended and edited them. It is unlikely that Aristotle's copy of his writings was unique and that there was no copy in the Alexandrian Library, but it is clear that the influence of Aristotle in the Hellenistic period did not depend on consulting his works, much as the succession of Academies does not seem to have been determined by reference to the texts of Plato's dialogues. The continuing influence of Plato was in the evolution of dialectics by which to support or refute doctrines, rather than in a continuity of doctrines. The continuing influence of Aristotle was in the application of scientific method, rather than in a continuity of scientific assumptions and principles. With the edition of Aristotle's works the influence of Aristotle took on different forms in later traditions. In the Roman tradition, initiated by Cicero on the basis of the Hellenistic Academic tradition, interpretation centered on the use of the method of topics in philosophy and rhetoric. In the Greek tradition, interpretation took the form of a series of paraphrases, epitomes, glosses, and commentaries on the doctrines of his treatises. Andronicus of Rhodes and Alexander of Aphrodisias adhered closely to the texts in their interpretations, and Alexander founded a naturalistic interpretation which continued in the Islamic Aristotelian tradition in the opposition of Alexandrianism and Averroism, but after Alexander the task of writing commentaries was taken over by the Platonic Academy, and the Platonic dialectic of Ideas was altered to the Neoplatonic transcendental dialectic. The interpretation of

Plato underwent a like transformation, and commentaries were written on the dialogues. Frequently the same commentators interpreted works of both Plato and Aristotle, and wrote treatises to show that the two philosophies accord in doctrine and are not in opposition. In the Second Sophistic, sophistic took the place of rhetoric or dialectic in the presentation of doctrines, and philosophy was applied in literature and the therapeutic arts of medicine. The formation of the tradition of Aristotle in the West was based on the Latin tradition, plus a Neoplatonic *Introduction to the Categories* by Porphyry, which Boethius translated and expounded, and a Sophistic *Paraphrase of the Topics* by Themistius, which Boethius expounded. Each of the three traditions which Boethius joined together transforms what Aristotle said and raises questions which have no bearing on the philosophy contained in his works, but they have nonetheless become central problems in the ongoing tradition of Aristotle in the West.

The Latin Aristotelian tradition took its form and beginning as a continuation and part of the history of the Academy. Cicero acknowledges adherence to the Academic philosophy, New and Old. Cicero wrote philosophical dialogues in which the speakers are representatives of the three Hellenistic schools—an Academic, a Stoic, and an Epicurean. He wrote dialogues and treatises on the theory and practice of rhetoric in which rhetoric is joined with the study of philosophy or limited to the study of prose style.

The Academic view of the relation of the schools of philosophy is that they express the same philosophy in different words. Cicero uses the terms and distinctions of the Stoics in his *De officiis*, because, since the Stoics and the Academics differ only verbally, and the teaching of ethics belongs properly to the Stoics, the Academics, and the Peripatetics, he will be able to follow the Stoics in particular, not as an interpreter, but in his usual manner borrowing from other sources.¹ This Academic statement of accord between the schools permits Stoic and Epicurean speakers in the dialogues to disagree with it. A Stoic speaker argues that the differences between Stoics and Peripatetics concerning the relation of external goods to happiness is real and not verbal, and an Epicurean speaker protests that the Epicureans are excluded from the ranks of philosophers by Cicero's Academic formulation of philosophic problems.

¹ Cicero *De officiis* 1. 2. 6.

In the treatises and dialogues on rhetoric Cicero gives two versions of the history of the separation of philosophy from rhetoric: one the separation of political rhetoric from prudence, the other the separation of rhetorical style from philosophical contents. In the first book of the *De inventione* he treats rhetoric as a branch of political science (*civilis ratio*). In the beginning, men wandered in the fields like animals, until a great and wise man became aware of the matter (*materia*) latent in the minds of men and how great the opportunity was to attain the greatest things (*quanta ad maximas res opportunitas*), and gathered men together to cultivate this power introducing them to every useful and good thing (*in unam quamque rem inducens utilem atque honestam*), and eloquence came into being.² It is probable that those who lacked eloquence and wisdom did not meddle in public affairs, and great and eloquent men did not concern themselves with private suits at law. The greatest things (*maximae res*) were administered by great men, but other men, not without shrewdness, concerned themselves with the petty controversies of private citizens. Since those who acquired eloquence without the study of philosophy often seemed equal or even superior in speaking, they seemed in their own opinion and that of the multitude to be worthy to govern the state. As a result of their rule, eloquence was brought into disrepute and unpopularity. Other worthy studies were pursued vigorously, and the study of eloquence was abandoned by men of the greatest talent. Cicero is convinced that the public thing, the republic (*res publica*), receives many benefits from eloquence as it is accompanied by wisdom, the moderator of all things (*omnium rerum*).³ Therefore, Cicero classified the oratorical faculty (*facultas*) as a part of political science (*civilis scientia*).⁴

In the second book of the *De inventione* Cicero treats rhetoric as an art of speaking (*ars dicendi*) and delineates that art by combining features of two traditions of rhetoric, following the example of the painter Zeuxis, who combined the beautiful features of five girls when commissioned by the citizens of Croton to paint a beautiful girl of their city. In one tradition it was treated in conjunction with philosophy; in the other it was treated as the art of speaking. The first tradition went back to Aristotle who collected the early books

² Cicero *De inventione* 1. 2. 2–3.

³ *Ibid.* 1. 4. 5.

⁴ *Ibid.* 1. 5. 6.

on rhetoric and restated their precepts with suavity and brevity, so that they are better known from Aristotle's statement of them than from their original formulations, and then published his own works. His successors devoted most of their attention to the greatest (*maxima*) parts of philosophy, as Aristotle himself had done, but they also left us many precepts about speaking. The other tradition of rhetoric limited to the art went back to Isocrates, whose works Cicero says he has not read, but he has read many treatises on the art by his disciples.⁵ Cicero likens the art of the orator to the art of the poet and classifies rhetoric as artful or artificial eloquence (*artificiosa eloquentia*) acquired as a habit by practice and art in imitating and perfecting natural eloquence which is an inborn faculty. These two traditions, one concerned with the sciences of philosophy among which rhetoric is a cognate part, the other devoted wholly to the study and teaching of speaking on all subjects, among others philosophy, were fused by later teachers, who borrowed what they thought was correct from both. Cicero uses all these authorities and makes his own contributions to the common store.

Aristotle distinguished between sciences and arts, between knowledge of things and disciplines of men. Arts or disciplines are acquired abilities to formulate and order knowledge, to confirm and refute opinions, and to judge and criticize beliefs and persuasions. Theories and methods are acquired in two ways, by special scientific inquiry and by general education (*paideia*), the one yielding true knowledge of things of particular kinds, the other the ability to judge statements, true or false, about all things.⁶ Aristotle distinguished the methods (*methodoi*) of the sciences, the "ways to" knowledge of things, from the "ways" (*hodoi*) of the arts adaptable to teaching or demonstrating or testing sciences, to confirming or refuting opinions of men, scientists or laymen, educated or uneducated, and to affecting attitudes and convictions by persuasion. The arts of analytic, dialectic, and rhetoric are themselves methods, but they are not scientific methods adapted to matters under investigation, but "in-arted" or "entechnical" methods (*entechnos methodos*)⁷ adapted to the rules or ways of art as contrasted to "un-arted" or "atechnical" proofs (*atech-*

⁵ Ibid. 2. 2. 6–9.

⁶ Aristotle *Parts of Animals* 1. 1. 639a1–15.

⁷ Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1. 1. 1355a4.

nos pistis).⁸ To the extent that the arts are particularized and adjusted to things of a particular kind, they lose their character as universal arts and become scientific. Truths discovered by different methods in different sciences can be stated, analyzed, and proved in the propositions and syllogisms of a common logic, the oppositions of opinions concerning science or anything else can be stated and resolved in the propositions and problems of a common dialectic, and particular convictions (*pistis*) can be communicated and implanted by the persuasive arguments (*pistis*) of a common rhetoric.

In Cicero's use of Aristotle's distinctions, the difference between the methods of sciences and the ways of arts disappears, and later scholars, medieval and modern, often treat *methodos* as a synonym of *hodos*. Cicero translates "*methodos*" by "*ratio*" and "*hodos*" by "*via*," and he applies both terms to Aristotle's *Topics*. The plural methods of many sciences are reduced to the single method of a unified art and science.

Aristotle characterizes the methods of analytic, dialectic, and rhetoric as methods of *dianoetic* teaching and learning, to distinguish them from scientific methods of investigating the nature of things. Teaching and learning by the use of reason proceeds from pre-existing knowledge of three kinds. Analytic finds its matter in the truths of mathematics and other such arts, presumably the other theoretic, practical, and poetic sciences. Dialectic finds its matter in arguments (*logos*), syllogistic arguments proceeding from assumptions granted by an intelligent audience, and inductive arguments exhibiting universals implicit in clearly known particulars. Rhetorical arguments persuade by the same means as dialectical arguments, by examples, which are a kind of induction, and enthymemes, which are a kind of syllogism.⁹ In the sciences principles are arrived at by induction, but they are known by intuition, a form of knowledge higher than demonstration.¹⁰

Cicero does not distinguish between the methods by which particular sciences inquire into the nature and causes of things or between the methods by which universal arts establish and communicate knowledge, opinions, and convictions. Aristotle's universal arts, like his particular methods, are transformed by Cicero into methods of dis-

⁸ Ibid. 1.15. 1375a22.

⁹ Aristotle *Posterior Analytics* 1. 1. 71a1–11; cf. 2.19. 99b20–100a9.

¹⁰ Ibid. 100a10–b17.

course (*ratio disserendi*). The transformation has profound effects on the later history of Aristotelian logic, since Cicero says that the whole subject which the Greeks called *logike* he calls *ratio disserendi*.¹¹ Thus, induction and deduction, which Aristotle limited to dialectic and rhetoric, become the principal divisions of the "Aristotelian logic." The universal arts were concerned with propositions, necessary, possible, and probable; the discursive arts are concerned with things, universal, particular, and indefinite. The matters treated in demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical arguments and the methods of treating them are assimilated into the general classes of what is said and ways of saying it.

Dialectic had undergone paradoxical changes when Aristotle had transformed it from the universal philosophical method of Plato into the second of three universal arts, concerned with opinions and not with scientific or philosophical truths. The Aristotelian dialectic undergoes like paradoxical changes when Cicero transforms it into one of the two parts of any method of discourse. Aristotle's *Topics* is an exposition of the art of dialectic in which topics are ways of using opinions in arguments. It is not a method of demonstrating truths, but of establishing and undermining opinions. It is useful for intellectual training, in casual conversation, and in the study of the philosophical sciences, for (1) the ability to raise difficulties on both sides of a question makes it easier to detect truth and falsity about the points that arise, and (2) scientific principles are primary and cannot be demonstrated, but they can be tested relative to generally accepted opinion, and dialectic, used in inquiry, was a way (*hodos*) to the principles of all methods (*methodos*).¹² According to Cicero, every "accurate method of discourse" (*omnis ratio diligens disserendi*)¹³ has two parts, one concerned with inventing, the other with judging. Aristotle, it seems to him, was the originator or prince (*princeps*) of both. The Stoics worked accurately in the ways (*via*) of judging by means of the *science* which they called dialectic (*dialektike*) but totally neglected the *art* which is called topic, even though it is more useful and prior in the order of nature.

When the universal arts became methods of discourse, the nature of rhetoric and dialectic, two of the universal arts, and the relations

¹¹ Cicero *De fato* 1. 1.

¹² Aristotle *Topics* 1. 2. 101a25–b4.

¹³ Cicero *Topics* 1. 2. 6.

between them were profoundly altered. One became an art, the other a science, although like other sciences it was also an art. One was concerned with discovering, the other with judging what was discovered. At the beginning of his *Rhetoric*, Aristotle says that rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic because both alike have to do with such matters as are to a degree within the cognizance of all men and are not confined to any science.¹⁴ He later calls rhetoric an offshoot, a likeness, and a part of dialectic, because neither is a science of anything, and both are faculties of producing arguments.¹⁵ Dialectic is concerned with the opinions of men—all men, or the majority, or the wise, all, the majority, or the most famous of them, or with opinions contrary to those that seem to be generally held, or with all opinions that are in accordance with the arts.¹⁶ Rhetoric is concerned with the judgments of audiences who hear speeches in law courts, legislative assemblies, or ceremonial gatherings like the Olympic games, and rhetorical arguments must start, not from any and every accepted opinion, but from opinions accepted by judges or hearers of those speeches or by those whose authority they recognize.¹⁷ Cicero quotes Aristotle's statement that rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic to show that a man of perfect eloquence should not only have the faculty of fluent speech, but should also acquire the neighboring and related "science of dialectic." He quotes Zeno the Stoic concerning the relation between the two, likening dialectic to a closed fist and rhetoric to an open palm, and interprets Aristotle's statement to mean that rhetoric is a method of saying or expressing (*ratio dicendi*) and is therefore more extended, and dialectic is a method of speaking or stating (*ratio loquendi*) and is therefore more compressed.¹⁸ Both are methods of discourse (*ratio disserendi*); one is an art of saying, the other a science of what is said.

Aristotle devised a technical language for rhetoric when he made it a universal art based on consideration of persuasive arguments (*pistis*) which determine the subject matter and the style and organization of speeches. Cicero preserved and used Aristotle's terms and distinctions but gave them different meanings and functions when he made rhetoric a discursive art and used rhetoric to give form and

¹⁴ Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1. 1. 1354a1–3.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 1. 2. 1356a25–34.

¹⁶ Aristotle *Topics* 1. 12. 105a23–b1.

¹⁷ Aristotle *Rhetoric* 2. 22. 1395b31–32.

¹⁸ Cicero *Orator* 31. 114.

content to all other discursive arts and to everything that is thought and said. Thereafter Cicero's discursive conceptions and applications were used in the interpretation of Aristotle's universal art. Rhetoric is a universal art for Aristotle because it has no subject matter, and Aristotle therefore uses places, proper and common, to produce a subject matter before taking up problems of statement and arrangement of statements about it. Rhetoric is a discursive art for Cicero because thought and action, moral and political, are products of language, or more accurately, *ratio* is inseparable from *oratio*, as the Greeks knew since both words are translations of *logos*, and discourse is a sequence which both thought and speech run through in the art of discourse (*ratio disserendi*). Language and the arrangement of speeches are therefore present from the beginning in the distinction and ordering of what is said and how it is said instead of being treated as ways of expressing and ordering matters already known, and the scope of matters expressed and presented in speeches is extended to include the subject matters of particular sciences, theoretic, practical, and poetic, which Aristotle excludes from matters to be treated by rhetoric.

Aristotle treats in turn in his *Rhetoric* (1) the kinds of rhetorical arguments—counseling, pleading, and displaying—and the proper places which determine their subject matters; (2) the parts of speeches or persuasive arguments, the common places and common arguments, by which proper places become the elements of particular arguments and produce the subject-matters of speeches; and (3) the words and arrangements of statements appropriate to those matters. Cicero treats in turn in his *De inventione* (1) the four issues or matters of rhetoric—conjectural, definitional, qualitative, and translative—and the five parts of rhetoric—*invention*, *disposition*, *elocution*, *memory*, and *pronunciation*; (2) the parts of a speech; and (3) the proper places of the kinds of speeches and kinds of issues. In Aristotle's separation of methods, the discovery and diffusion of truths proceeds by stages—the discovery of truths by particular methods of scientific inquiry, their statement and proof by a common method of analytical demonstrative arguments, the testing of opinions about them by common methods of dialectical arguments, and the diffusion of convictions about them by common methods of rhetorical persuasive arguments. In Cicero's reduction of the methods of the particular sciences and of the universal arts to methods of discourse, scientific truths, like everything else that is expressed in Aristotle's separate

functional stages, are reduced to a single process in which what is said can be distinguished from how it is said. With respect to matter, the conjectural issue takes precedence—the existence of a thing must be established before inquiring into what it is, how it is qualified, and who is competent to judge answers to these questions. According to Aristotle a geometer need not prove the existence of triangles before examining their nature and properties; it is the function of another art to establish their existence. With respect to discourse, invention or discovery takes precedence—arguments must be discovered before they can be ordered and given suitable expression in which the order of statements and of things is fixed and made available for systematization in words and actions. According to Aristotle all that is needed in the universal arts is a supply of propositions derived from the sciences, opinions, and convictions of men and of propositions constructed like them or contradictory to them. In universal arts, memory serves the function of invention in the discursive arts.

The orders and priorities of the discursive arts have become firmly implanted in our conceptions of scientific method and of progress in the sciences and arts, and Cicero's interpretation of Aristotle is responsible for the reputation Aristotle has had as empirical scientist and as originator of heuristic methods and of inductive and deductive logics. Since Aristotle constructs the matrix of the technical terms and distinctions of his universal art of rhetoric and since Cicero transforms them into universal terms and distinctions applicable to all forms of discourse and all subjects of discourse in three comparable stages of analysis, the radical and paradoxical nature of the transformation may be seen concretely by comparing the three books of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* with the three analytic steps which Cicero takes in his *De inventione*.

(1) Aristotle's statement of his objective in the *Rhetoric* differs from Cicero's description of it: he seeks to introduce a consideration of persuasive arguments (*pistis*) which is left out of "arts of rhetoric" in spite of the fact that it is the heart of rhetoric, not to join rhetoric to philosophy. The "arts of rhetoric," in the absence of persuasive arguments, are concerned with inessentials: their concern with the means of arousing emotions, their exclusive concern with the method of forensic rhetoric in spite of the fact that it is the same as the method of political rhetoric and political rhetoric is more important, and their concern with the contents of the parts of a speech. He sketches in the kinds of persuasive arguments, enthymeme and ex-

ample, and the kinds of places, common and proper, from which they are derived. He undertakes to begin with proper places of argument by classifying the kinds of rhetoric and seeking the elements of which each is composed and the propositions which each must use.¹⁹ He divides rhetoric according to kinds of audiences which determine what subjects (*peri hou*) orators of different kinds must know. The end of speeches of counselors or advisors (*sumbouleutikos*) is to establish the expediency or harmfulness of future actions. The end of speeches of pleaders (*dikanikos*) is to determine the justice or injustice of past actions. The end of display (*epideiktikos*) oratory is to set forth the honorable or good and the dishonorable or bad in present persons and actions.

The subjects, that is, the “about what,” of dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms are places or topics, not things—common places of ethical, physical, and logical propositions and propositions of other sciences that differ in kind, and proper places of propositions which are peculiar to each genus or species of things. Common places do not deal with any particular subject matter and therefore cannot increase our understanding of any particular class of things, but the better the selection of propositions for proper places the nearer one comes to setting up the principles of a science other than dialectic or rhetoric. Proper places are propositions peculiar to each class of things; common places are propositions common to all alike.²⁰ In book 1 of the *Rhetoric* Aristotle begins with the proper places of the three kinds of rhetoric and expounds them in chapters 4 to 14. The most important matters on which men deliberate and counselors speak are five: ways and means, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and legislation. A speaker, to present virtue and vice, noble and base, which are the objects of praise and blame, must establish a character for himself as well as for those about whom he speaks and must have at his disposal propositions about the noble (*kalon*) and about virtue (*arete*). For accusation and defense the pleader should be equipped with propositions about wrongdoing, its motivations, its perpetrators, and its victims.

Cicero distinguishes the kinds of rhetoric, not according to the ends determined by kinds of audiences, as Aristotle did, but according to the matter of the art (*materia artis*). He defines the matter of

¹⁹ Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1. 2. 1358a32–35.

²⁰ Ibid. 1358a1–35; cf. *Topics* 1. 14. 105a34–b37.

art as that with which all art, and the faculty which is formed by art, is concerned.²¹ After citing Gorgias who held that the orator would speak better than anyone else on all subjects, he says that he agrees with Aristotle that the function (*officium*) of the orator is concerned with three genera of things (*genera rerum*), and he chooses from among the terms used for the three kinds of rhetoric by Aristotle, not those which characterize the speaker—"counselor," "pleader," and "displayer"—but three which relate the oratorical functions to their matter—"deliberative," "judicial," and "demonstrative" and which therefore do not restrict the kinds of rhetoric to the narrow ends of particular kinds of audiences, but permit them to be expanded to all matters of all kinds of discourse. Those words are usually substituted for the words Aristotle uses in translations of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Cicero postpones consideration of the nature, the end, and the function of rhetoric in order to consider the matter and the parts of the art together. The matter of rhetoric is the issues and things encountered in all forms of discourse. The parts are the processes of thought, statement, and action employed in their resolution.

The matter of rhetoric as a discursive method includes the matter of the arts and sciences. In the first chapter of the second book of the *Posterior Analytics* Aristotle distinguishes four kinds of things we search for (*zetoumena*) because there are four kinds of things we know (*epistametha*).²² The four questions—of fact (*to hoti*), of cause (*to dioti*), if it is (*ei esti*), what it is (*ti esti*)—may be distinguished by means of logical subjects and predicates, is S P?, why is S P?, does S exist?, and what is S? These four scientific questions become four rhetorical issues of controversy in Cicero's method of discourse, and the order of the paired questions is reversed: the existence and definition of subjects are established before the predicates applied to them and why they are applied are examined. The issues arise sequentially: first questions of fact (*factum*) in disputes about the conjectural issue, is it?, followed by disputes about the definitional issue, what is it?, if it is conceded to be, followed by disputes about the qualitative issue, of what sort is it?, or what is its value, or kind, or quality? once it has been defined; and finally, disputes about the translative issue of who is the proper judge to decide

²¹ Cicero *De inventione* 1. 5. 7.

²² Aristotle *Posterior Analytics* 2. 1. 89b23–35.

the case?, if the decision is put in question.²³ Aristotle's questions of demonstrative logical proof turn on relations of terms and propositions. Cicero's questions of discursive rhetorical argumentation are issues encountered in controversies about things. The question "what" becomes a question of name or definition; the question "why" becomes a question of competence or authority. "Every thing (*res*) which has within it a controversy posed by speech and debate contains a question (*quaestio*) of fact (*factum*) or of name (*nomen*) or of kind (*genus*) or of action (*actio*). We therefore call this question from which a case (*causa*) arises a constitution or issue (*constitutio*)." ²⁴

The parts of rhetoric as a discursive method include the devices used to resolve issues encountered in all forms of discourse. Cicero says that he follows Aristotle in his treatment of the matter of rhetoric. He says that he bases his analysis of the parts of rhetoric on the division used by most authorities. Like the four issues the five parts of rhetoric follow a sequential order. Invention is the excogitation of true and verisimilar things (*res*) which render a case or cause probable. Disposition is the distribution of invented things in an order. Elocution is the accommodation of suitable words to the invention. Memory is the mind's firm perception of things and words. Pronunciation is the moderation of voice and body from the dignity of things and words.²⁵ Cicero sometimes calls the fifth part of rhetoric "action" rather than "pronunciation," and both words are usually translated "delivery." Cicero argues that the three kinds of rhetoric are rendered distinct by their matter because they are genera of causes and no one of them can be a species of either of the others.²⁶

(2) Aristotle turns from the consideration of proper places of kinds of speeches in the first book of the *Rhetoric* to the consideration of common characteristics of all rhetorical speeches. His analysis is based on consideration of the character of orators and the passions of audiences (chapters 1 to 17), on the basis of which he formulates common places (*koinoi topoi*) and common persuasive arguments (*koinoi pisteis*) shared by all forms of rhetoric (chapters 18 to 21), and then uses common places and arguments to classify and analyze

²³ Cicero *De inventione* 1. 7. 10.

²⁴ *Ibid.* 1. 8. 10.

²⁵ *Ibid.* 1. 7. 9.

²⁶ *Ibid.* 1. 9. 10.

proper places from which enthymemes can be constructed to make subject matters about which speeches are made (chapters 23 to 26). The proper places of the first book are subjects “about which” speeches of different kinds can be made; the proper places of the second book are elements “out of which” arguments can be constructed for any kind of speech. Each of the three kinds of rhetoric has its special end, and proper places are accepted opinions and propositions “out of which” to draw persuasive arguments for speeches designed to counsel, dispute, or display. The four places common to all three kinds of rhetoric are possible and impossible, past happenings, future happenings, and magnitude or amplification and delimitation, or maximizing and minimizing, although each of these common places is particularly appropriate to one of the parts of rhetoric—amplification to display, past to pleading, and future to counseling speeches.²⁷

Persuasive arguments (*pistis*) proper to the different kinds of rhetoric are classified and organized under the proper places of each kind of rhetoric from which they have been drawn. The forms of persuasive argument common to all kinds of rhetoric, which were enumerated at the beginning of the first book of the *Rhetoric*,²⁸ are examined in the second book after the common places have been analyzed.²⁹ There are two kinds of common arguments, example and enthymeme. The example resembles induction, and induction is a principle. There are two kinds of examples—propositions derived from what actually happened, or history, and invented parallels of which there are two kinds, parables and fables. Maxims (*gnome*) are statements, not about particular facts, but of a general kind, and not about any and every subject, but about courses of conduct to be chosen or avoided. They are incomplete enthymemes. Enthymemes, the second kind of common argument, differ from syllogisms because they depend on a command of actual facts, and the more clearly they are connected with the subject the more suitable they are and less common. The proper places which differentiate the subject matters of the kinds of rhetoric and the common arguments which different subject matters share yield common arguments about good and evil, noble and base, just and unjust as well as common arguments about character, passions, and habits. The proper places

²⁷ Aristotle *Rhetoric* 2. 18. 1391b23–1392a7.

²⁸ *Ibid.* 1. 2.

²⁹ *Ibid.* 2. 20–22.

which differentiate the common arguments and common facts of rhetorical speeches yield particular arguments and conclusions, and proper places become elements of syllogisms. There are two kinds of enthymemes, monstrative (*deiktikon*) enthymemes which show that something is or is not, and refutative (*elenktikon*) enthymemes against either demonstration, positive or negative. Monstrative enthymemes are formed by conjunction of compatible propositions; refutative enthymemes by conjunction of incompatible propositions. The proper places of monstrative and refutative enthymemes and of sham enthymemes provide the particular propositions of all arguments. The proper places make the transition from general arguments about subject matters of a particular kind to particular arguments about individual things and facts.

Cicero turns from the consideration of the issues and the parts of rhetoric in the first part of book 1 of the *De inventione* to the consideration of cases and the parts of cases and of speeches. Having expounded the issues and their parts Cicero puts off examining examples of each kind until he has provided a store of arguments (*argumentorum copia*) for each of them, "for the method of argumentation (*argumentandi ratio*) will be clearer if they can be applied immediately to kinds and examples of causes."³⁰ Aristotle formed rhetoric as a universal art by examining rhetorical speeches to determine the characteristics and kinds of rhetorical arguments and their matters. Cicero developed rhetoric as a discursive art by examining the methods of argumentation to determine the characteristics and kinds of arguments applied to different cases and matters. Cicero differentiated the issues of rhetoric by making Aristotle's scientific questions matters of debate rather than problems of inquiry. In like fashion he formulated the methods of argumentation by combining the methods Aristotle distinguished in the sciences and the arts into a single method of discourse. These changes have continued to influence our interpretation of Aristotle's logic, dialectic, and rhetoric in the tradition of Aristotle in the West as well as our interpretation of the fundamental ideas of his theoretic, practical, and poetic sciences.

The method of argumentation is developed sequentially in the parts of a speech—exordium, narration, partition, confirmation, reprehension, and conclusion.³¹ There are questions about the case

³⁰ Cicero *De inventione* 1. 12. 16.

³¹ *Ibid.* 1. 14. 19.

which should be determined before the speech is made: is it simple or complex and if complex does it invoke several questions or a comparison, does the controversy turn on reason or on written documents, and finally, what the question is, the reason, the judgment, and the validation (*firmamentum*), which should develop out of the determination of the issue.³² The exordium brings the auditor into a proper frame of mind to receive the rest of the speech. It is based on consideration of the five kinds of cases and its methods are two, to serve as principle and as insinuation. The narrative is an exposition of things which have occurred (*res gesta*) or might have occurred. There are three kinds of narrative: one which states the case and the whole reason of controversy, one which goes beyond to other issues, and one which has no relation to civil cases but is for amusement. Amusing narratives have two parts, one concerned with actions or affairs (*negotia*), which has three forms, a fable which is not true and has no verisimilitude, a history of actual occurrences remote from our time, and an argument or fictitious narrative which might have occurred, and the other concerned with persons which is a presentation of the words and minds of persons as well as of things.³³ Partition makes the whole speech clear and perspicuous by opening up the cause and determining the controversy. It has two parts: stating what is agreed on and what is left in dispute to fix the issue in the auditor's mind, and expounding the things to be treated to fix certain things in his mind.³⁴ The uses of partition are illustrated by the way in which the narrative follows the plan of the partition in a play of Terence.

Confirmation is the part of the speech by which a case acquires persuasiveness (*fides*), authority, and validation (*firmamentum*) by argumentation. Rather than give rules for each kind of case, Cicero undertakes to set forth at the beginning, without any order or arrangement, the forest (*silva*) (Francis Bacon continued this use of the term) and universal matter (*materia universa*) of all argumentations, and later to show how each kind of case should be confirmed by all methods (*ratio*) of argumentation drawn from this store of raw material. All things (*res*) are confirmed by arguing either from

³² Ibid. 1. 13. 17.

³³ Ibid. 1. 19. 27.

³⁴ Ibid. 1. 22. 31.

what is attributed to persons or to affairs (*negotia*).³⁵ After having treated the places (*locus*) from which arguments are drawn, Cicero turns to the consideration of argumentation: it will have to be either probable or necessary, and he gives a brief description of it: "argumentation seems to be a discovery (*inventum*) either to show probably or to demonstrate necessarily something from some genus of things."³⁶ The genus of argumentation concerned with necessary demonstration is usually treated in speaking by dilemma or enumeration or simple conclusion. The probable is that which is usually done or is posited in opinion or has some likeness to these, whether false or true. The probable used in argumentation is a *sign*, or is *credible* to the auditor, or is *judged* by an authority, or is *comparable*.

The arguments of logic, dialectic, and rhetoric, which Aristotle had distinguished, are forms of argumentation, and their common characteristics are stated in terms borrowed primarily from the discursive art of rhetoric. "All argumentation, therefore, must be carried out either by induction or by ratiocination."³⁷ Induction is speech (*oratio*) which leads a disputant to give assent first to undoubted things (*res non dubia*) and, through that assent, to doubtful things (*dubia quaedam res*) which are proved because of their likeness to the things to which he assented. An example is drawn from a philosophical dialogue of Aeschines Socraticus. Ratiocination is a speech which draws from the probable thing (*res probabilis*) itself something which, stated and known through itself, confirms itself by its own force and reason.³⁸ Inductions are necessary or probable; deductions are probable. Cicero then discusses in detail theories which divide argumentation into parts or premises, five, four, three, two, or one, taking examples from Platonic, Stoic, and Peripatetic forms of argumentation (Aristotle and Theophrastus are numbered among the adherents of five premises), and ranging through syllogism, enthymeme, and example.³⁹ He ends by acknowledging that in philosophy argumentations are treated by other methods, numerous and obscure, concerning which a certain system (*artificium*) has been devised, but they seem unfit for use by orators. Reprehension (*reprehensio*) is the part of a speech in which the argumentation of adver-

³⁵ Ibid. 1. 24. 34.

³⁶ Ibid. 1. 29. 44.

³⁷ Ibid. 1. 31. 51.

³⁸ Ibid. 1. 34. 57.

³⁹ Ibid. 1. 34. 57–51. 77.

saries in confirmation are diluted, weakened, or removed. It uses the same source of invention as confirmation, places or attributes of persons and affairs. All argumentations are reprehended in one of three ways: by not granting one or more assumptions, by denying that the complex made of them follows if they are granted, or by showing that the kind of argumentation itself is vicious, or by posing against a firm argumentation another equally firm or firmer.⁴⁰ The peroration is the exit and determination of the whole speech. It has three parts: (1) enumeration, by which things said (*res dictae*) dispersedly and diffusely are brought together; (2) indignation, in which hatred against a man or offense against a thing is aroused; and (3) lament or complaint (*conquestio*), which seeks to arouse pity and sympathy.⁴¹

(3) Aristotle turns from the consideration of proper places of kinds of speeches and the proper places of all speeches to the style and arrangement of speeches. He says at the beginning of the third book of the *Rhetoric* that there are three things that must be considered in a speech: that “out of which” the arguments are derived, style (*lexis*), and arrangement (*taxis*). Aristotle argues that any speech (*logos*)—forensic, deliberative, or epideictic—has only two essential parts, statement and proof, or at most four parts by the addition of introduction and epilogue. The division currently used is absurd, for narrative is found only in forensic and not in the other two kinds of speeches.⁴² At the beginning of the *Rhetoric* he had argued that current treatises on rhetoric omitted treatment of the essential part, the persuasive argument (*pistis*), and dealt only with non-essentials, such as rules about the content of “introductions” or “narrations or any of the other divisions of the speech.”⁴³

Cicero turns from consideration of the matter and parts of rhetoric and the argumentation and parts of speeches in the first book of the *De inventione* to consideration of arguments appropriate to the kinds of rhetoric and the kinds of issues. When Aristotle distinguished the three kinds of rhetoric in the first book of his *Rhetoric*, he used proper places to determine the distinctive subject matter of each. Cicero uses common places and proper places to construct

⁴⁰ Ibid. 1. 42. 78–79.

⁴¹ Ibid. 1. 52. 98–56. 109.

⁴² Aristotle *Rhetoric* 3. 13. 1414a30–b18.

⁴³ Ibid. 1. 1. 1354b16–20.

arguments from an undifferentiated mass of raw material, and the different kinds of rhetoric use the same matter and the same places in a sequence, comparable to the sequential order of the issues and of the parts of rhetoric, from judicial to deliberative to demonstrative. He argues that all causes—demonstrative, deliberative, and judicial—must turn on one or more issues, and he expounds the adversary oppositions in the judicial genus of causes and precepts, and transfers them to the similar controversies of the other two genera of causes, deliberative and demonstrative. Judicial rhetoric is therefore treated in detail from paragraph 14 to 154, and deliberative and demonstrative rhetoric are treated in themselves very briefly from paragraph 155 to 176 and from paragraph 176 to 177.

Cicero begins his examination of the judicial oration with the case of a man accused of murder and then examines the places, proper to judicial or common to several genera of oratory or speech, from which the counsel for the defense and the prosecutor draw their argument to resolve issues of fact, of definition, of competence, and of quality. The fundamental proper place in the case of the man accused of murder is impulse (*impulsio*) and premeditation (*ratiocinatio*). The cause is the case. The places may have to do with the character of the person⁴⁴ or the nature of the action (*negotium*).⁴⁵ Cicero defines a commonplace as an argument which can be transferred to many cases. It is either an amplification of something certain (*certa res*) or something doubtful (*dubia res*), such as that it is right and is not right to base belief on suspicions.⁴⁶ When the fact (*factum*) and the name of the fact have been granted, and there is no dispute about procedure (*actio*), the force and nature and genus of what has been done (*negotium*) is examined in the qualitative issue. It has two parts: the legal, concerned with what was done (*negotialis*); and the juridical (*iuridicalis*), concerned with equity. The places of the legal have to do with the bases and kinds of law. The places of the equitable have to do with the nature of equality and inequality, and the reason of reward and punishment. In addition to controversies involving reason, there are controversies involving written documents (*scriptum*) in judicial rhetoric. They arise from ambiguity, from the letter and intent (*scriptum et sententia*), from conflict of laws, from ratio-

⁴⁴ Cicero *De inventione* 2. 9. 28 ff.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 2. 12. 38 ff.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.* 2. 15. 45.

ination, and from definition. After having treated the argumentations adapted to the judicial genus of causes, Cicero gives the places and precepts of argumentation in the deliberative and demonstrative genera. Every cause turns on some issue, but certain places are proper to these causes, which are not separated from issues but are accommodated to the ends of these genera. It is generally agreed that the end of the judicial genus is equity, that is, a certain part of the good (*honestas*). Aristotle considers utility (*utilitas*) the end in the deliberative genus, but Cicero prefers to include both the good and the useful. The good is the end in the demonstrative genus. Therefore certain argumentations will be treated commonly and similarly in all genera of cause, but others should be joined separately to the end to which the speech as a whole is referred.⁴⁷

The precepts for deliberation are determined by three kinds of things to be sought (*res expetenda*) and three kinds of things to be avoided (*res vitanda*): (1) things which attract by their own power and not because of gain, such as virtue, science, and truth; (2) things to be sought for their fruit and utility, such as money; and (3) things which unite these two, such as friendship and good repute. The places of these things to be sought or avoided are examined in a detailed enumeration of virtues and goods related to them and utilities of body and things.⁴⁸ Praise and vituperation are derived from places attributed to persons. They can be divided into goods of mind, body and extraneous things and the uses which are made of those goods.⁴⁹ Aristotle used proper places to keep rhetorical argument distinct from scientific argument. Cicero does not distinguish the two kinds of arguments, and the proper places of the three genera of rhetoric become brief treatises on politics, ethics, and esthetics.

The *De inventione* closes with the observation that this presentation of the method (*ratio*) of argumentation in all kinds of causes has been a sufficient exposition of invention, which is the first and greatest part of rhetoric. Aristotle conceived of places as containers of collections of arguments stored in memory. Rhetoric is a universal art which borrows its matter from sciences, accepted opinions, and arts. It is important for the speaker to have a supply of arguments and definitions and premises concerning questions that turn up fre-

⁴⁷ Ibid. 2. 51. 144–56.

⁴⁸ Ibid. 2. 52–53. 147–76.

⁴⁹ Ibid. 2. 39. 177–78.

quently, for as a person of trained memory remembers things from the mere mention of their places, so a person becomes better in arguing if he sees his premises classified and ordered.⁵⁰ Cicero characterizes Aristotle's topics in terms of invention rather than memory; it is an art of inventing arguments in a discipline of discourse, and its methods apply to the formation of sciences, opinions, and arts as well as to persuasion. The transition from Hellenistic to Roman rhetoric was the time of the development of arts of memory and arts of invention; they are both arts of topics or places.⁵¹

The methods, or "ways to," which Aristotle distinguishes, encounter characteristic difficulties. Scientific inquiry, or method applied to things and causes, takes its beginning from an *aporia* or "no way in." Dialectical inquiry, or method applied to opinions of men, takes its beginning from a problem (*problema*) or projection thrown out by opinions. Rhetorical inquiry, or method applied to convictions of hearers, takes its beginning in arguments available for persuasion (*pistis*).

These are related but different difficulties. The nature of their relations and differences may be seen by considering the difficulties encountered in defining "place," proper and common, in science, dialectic, and rhetoric. Aristotle says at the beginning of his inquiry concerning place in the *Physics*, "The question, what is place?, encounters many blocked ways (*aporia*). For according to the data from which we start we seem to reach different and inconsistent conclusions. Moreover, we have inherited nothing from other thinkers either in the statement of the difficulties or in their resolution".⁵² Scientific inquiry is a search (*zetesis*) for things and causes. Examination of the data and available hypotheses reduces the possible definitions to four: the form, or the matter, or some kind of extension between the surfaces of the containing body, or the first motionless boundary (*peras*) of what contains. The fourth is shown to be the definition of place by eliminating the first three.⁵³ Moveable bodies exist and move in places; each has its proper place, and they share and move in common places.

⁵⁰ Aristotle *Topics* 8. 14. 163b17–33.

⁵¹ Cf. Richard McKeon, "Arts of Invention and Arts of Memory: Creation and Criticism," *Critical Inquiry* 1 (1975): 723–38.

⁵² Aristotle *Physics* 4. 1. 208a33–b1; Cf. *On Length and Shortness of Life* 1. 464b21–39; *On the Soul* 1. 2. 403b20–27.

⁵³ Aristotle *Physics* 4. 4. 210b33–212b30.

The difficulties encountered in dialectical inquiry are propositions and problems, not impediments to the extension of inquiry into things and their causes, nor impediments to the search for middle terms and causes in scientific demonstration and definition. A dialectical *proposition* is a question resting on opinion (*erotesis endoxos*).⁵⁴ A dialectical *problem* is a speculation or theory (*theorema*) leading either to choice or avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, either by itself or as an aid to the solution of some other like problem.⁵⁵ It is a speculation on which people have no opinion, one way or the other, or on which the opinion of most people and the opinion of the wise are in opposition, or on which there are oppositions among commonly held opinions and expert opinions. A thesis is a supposition by a famous philosopher contrary to common opinion. A thesis is a problem, but not all problems are theses. A dialectical place is a proximate boundary or delimitation or definition of opinions. It is a place in which propositions are given fixed meanings and problems are resolved in proofs by examining subjects and predicates that are predicable of them to determine whether a given predicate is an accident, a genus, a property, or a definition of a given subject. Aristotle used dialectical places to refute opposed theories of place and to remove the blocks which impeded his scientific investigation. Opinions of all kinds are interpreted, established, and undermined, in dialectical places; propositions derive their form from proper places, and problems are resolved in common places; propositions and problems are both questions.

The difficulties encountered in rhetorical inquiry are convictions or persuasions (*pistis*) held as beliefs or made as arguments. They are not blocks to the use of scientific method nor problems of meaning treated in the use of the dialectical method. Aristotle defined the physical places of bodies in the *Physics* and used the definition in his scientific inquiries. He investigated the dialectical places of opinions in the *Topics* and used the dialectical method to remove blocks that impeded his scientific inquiry concerning physical place. In the *Rhetoric*, he related common places and proper places to common arguments and particular arguments, and related rhetorical places to the places of dialectic and to the conclusions of science and logic. The methods of rhetoric appear in the schematic ordering of all Aristotle's works: in the balance of the methods of the particular

⁵⁴ Aristotle *Topics* 1. 10. 104a8–9.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 1. 11. 104b1–5.

sciences and the methods of the universal arts and in the transition from one to another, in the translation of the methods and results of scientific inquiry by which truths are discovered and proved into the methods and ideas of general education (*paideia*) by which students acquire the ability to understand and judge statements and arguments, including those of scientists, in the transitions from the use of the dialectical method to scientific inquiry which he frequently marks by saying, "now let us make a fresh start." Subject matters and arguments are formed in rhetorical places; any coherent discourse is formed by use of a proper place, and all persuasive arguments are constructed from proper places as elements and are connected by common places; style and arrangement of statement are adapted to matters made available by arguments.

Cicero does not retain Aristotle's distinction of three methods but reduces them to the single method of discourse which treats the form and the matter, the application and the art, of whatever is said. The three difficulties encountered in the use of the three methods are likewise reduced to one. Impediments to scientific inquiry were reduced to "problems" or, since "*problema*" became a Latin word only after Cicero's time, to "questions," the word he used to translate "*problema*." We still follow Cicero's terminology when we call scientific difficulties problems or questions, although Dewey tried to return to the conception of encountered difficulties or blocks in his analysis of the "problematic situation." Dialectical problems or questions were in turn stated as rhetorical issues, and scientific inquiry is still thought to consist of determining in turn, whether the thing under investigation exists, what it is, what its properties are, and who says so or why? Aristotle's four scientific questions became Cicero's four rhetorical issues to provide matter for all forms of discourse. The formation of any discourse concerning any matter goes through the same five steps of invention, organization, formulation, memory, and action. Cicero used poetry as a model for the discussion of rhetoric, and he proposed rhetoric as the method by which to remedy the lack of a history of Rome. Rhetoric, as a result, provided the methodological framework and the technical terminology for philosophy, science, art, and history, and the arguments, for and against, of controversial and adversary oppositions of judicial rhetoric provide a structure of investigation and proof in scientific inquiry, literary criticism, moral judgment, and political policy. The

true, the good, and the useful are not subject to deliberation or discussion but to controversy and debate.

Cicero's adaptation of Aristotle's terminology and distinctions to reunite rhetoric and philosophy in the *De inventione* had radical and paradoxical consequences in later philosophical conceptions of rhetoric as part of political science and as artificial eloquence, that is, on the uses of discourse and its forms. His exposition of Aristotle's topics to his friend Trebatius in the *Topics* as an art of invention of arguments, which extends beyond his friend's interest in the places of legal arguments to places of philosophical arguments, has like puzzling and pervasive consequence in later philosophical discussions of the relation between dialectic and topic, dialectic and rhetoric, and philosophy and rhetoric. Aristotle used topic as the method of dialectic, and he distinguished between scientific and dialectical proof. Cicero credits him with the origination of both topic and dialectic, but he adds that the Stoics devoted themselves to the science of dialectic. Cicero divided the art of discourse into two parts, an Aristotelian art of discovering arguments and a Stoic dialectic of judging and applying arguments to extraneous subject matters, a conception of dialectic which led him to use the Stoic dialectic to treat moral questions in the *De officiis*. For Aristotle, dialectic and rhetoric were two coeval universal arts, and rhetoric was a subdivision of dialectic. For Cicero dialectic was one of the two parts of every organized discourse, including rhetorical discourses. Aristotle distinguished dialectic from rhetoric by distinguishing dialectical topics from rhetorical topics. For Cicero dialectic and topic are parts of rhetoric and of philosophy. For Aristotle philosophy is composed of the particular sciences, and rhetoric is a universal art devoid of subject matter. For Cicero philosophy is not distinguished from rhetoric by their methods, since both use topical and dialectical methods, but by the questions they consider: rhetoric is concerned with definite questions; philosophy with unlimited questions.⁵⁶

Aristotle distinguished problems into universal and particular.⁵⁷ The ways of confirming or refuting opinions universally can be used on both kinds of problems, for if we show that a predicate belongs to a subject in all instances we have shown that it belongs in any

⁵⁶ Cicero *De inventione* 1. 6. 8; *Topics* 21. 79–80.

⁵⁷ Aristotle *Topics* 2. 1. 108b37–38.

particular instance, and if we show that it does not belong in some instance we have shown that it does not belong in every instance. Problems are solved, not by discovering things and causes, nor by using causes as connectives in scientific arguments, but by producing arguments for or against opinions from places or storehouses of arguments. Cicero distinguishes two kinds of questions, delimited or undefined (*infinutum*) and definite or defined (*definitum*). A definite question is a cause or a case (*causa*) argued in an issue about particulars. An unlimited question is a position taken (*propositum*) on an issue without specification of the particulars to which it may be applied. Cicero uses places, common and proper, to resolve both the definite questions of rhetoric and the indefinite questions of philosophy. Aristotle's theoretic sciences do not have practical applications, and his practical sciences may make use of facts and theories but they are not derived from theoretic laws or principles. In Cicero's arts of discourse the undefined questions of philosophy are related to the definite questions of rhetoric as parts.⁵⁸

Since rhetoric is not a scientific but an enarted or entechanical method, Aristotle distinguishes between enarted arguments (*pistis entechnos*) which a speaker constructs by method and art and unarted arguments (*pistis atechnos*) which he does not form but uses. The latter are used properly in the forensic rhetoric of the law court, and sometimes in the deliberative rhetoric of the assembly. They are five in number—law, witnesses, contracts, torture, and oaths.⁵⁹ They are not derived from places, as the arguments formed by art are, but places may be used to interpret them much as they are used to form enthymemes.⁶⁰ When this distinction is transferred from Aristotle's universal art of rhetoric to Cicero's discursive art of rhetoric it becomes a distinction between intrinsic (*intrinsicus*) and extrinsic (*extrinsicus*) places of arguments, that is, arguments which inhere in the thing under discussion, and arguments which are brought in from outside.⁶¹ Cicero identifies the distinction with the one which the Greeks make when they called extrinsic places *atechnoi*, that is, without art (*artis expers*).⁶²

⁵⁸ Cicero *Topics* 21. 89.

⁵⁹ Aristotle *Rhetoric* 1. 2. 1355b35–1356a1 and 1. 15. 1375a22–25.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* 1. 15. 1376a29–33.

⁶¹ Cicero *Topics* 2. 8; 4. 24; 19. 72.

⁶² *Ibid.* 4. 24.

The change from enarted and unarted arguments to intrinsic and extrinsic places of arguments alters the nature, methods, and relations of the arts and sciences and of rhetoric and philosophy. Aristotle uses places in dialectic and rhetoric to influence opinions and feelings, but not in scientific inquiry or apodeictic proof to state or ground truths and proofs. Cicero uses places in all forms of methodical discourse, philosophy, science, poetry, and history as well as rhetoric, to determine and define things under consideration—proper places for particular things or particular kinds of things, common places for universal things, intrinsic places for essential determinations grounded in art, extrinsic places for external determinations grounded in evidence. Aristotle's atechanical arguments were used with rhetorical arguments in law courts. The evidentness or evidence produced by arguments is distinct from the facts or evidence attested by witnesses. Cicero includes an account of extrinsic places in the *Topics* for the sake of completeness, even though Trebatius's interest in places is limited to those intrinsic to civil law. Arguments which are not formed by art are posited by testimony, and Cicero therefore does not treat atechanical arguments as Aristotle does by listing forms of evidence that may be introduced into a court, but instead examines the extrinsic places that make evidence worth considering, and listing things that give it authority—the nature and virtues of the person testifying, necessity imposed by torture and by fears, circumstances, chance, and the testimony of gods and of outstanding men, ranging from public men to orators, philosophers, poets, and historians.⁶³ A speaker or a writer uses intrinsic place to invent arguments; he uses statements and arguments of other people as extrinsic places to support his position. Places are used to solve definite questions about specified things and unlimited questions about “anything whatever” (*quacumque de re*), which are of two kinds, questions of cognition and questions of action. The distinction between these two kinds of unlimited questions provides the basis for Kant's later distinction between the realm of nature and the realm of morality, as the distinction between definite and unlimited questions provides the basis for his distinction between *de facto* and *de iure* questions, in terms which carry with them the marks of the origin of the distinction in judicial rhetoric.

⁶³ Ibid. 19–20. 72–78.

Cicero's treatment of intrinsic places falls into two parts, one concerned with the places of discourse about a thing as a whole, the other concerned with the places of questions and issues about conjoined things. He enumerates four places at the beginning of his treatment of intrinsic places:⁶⁴ arguments may be derived from the thing as a whole, from the enumeration of its parts, from the notation by which it is expressed, and from things which are in some way affected by the thing under investigation. He then enumerates twelve subdivisions of the places of conjoined things.⁶⁵ At the end of his treatment of intrinsic places he lists sixteen places for the invention of arguments: definition, partition, notation, conjugates, genus, species, likeness, difference, contraries, adjuncts, consequents, antecedents, contradictions, causes, effects, and comparison of things greater, less, and equal, and closes the list noting that no further seats of arguments need be sought.⁶⁶ In the course of discussing the different places Cicero identifies those which are peculiarly suited to one of the kinds of discourse, like theoretic philosophy, civil science, jurisprudence, poetry, or to one of the kinds of rhetoric.

Cicero's intrinsic places are a selection and rearrangement of Aristotle's places of confirmation and refutation of arguments in the twenty-third chapter of the second book of the *Rhetoric*. The changes which Cicero introduced when he made them intrinsic places have affected later conceptions of definition, induction, deduction, and cause, in spite of the fact that he professes to be expounding the topics of Aristotle. Aristotle uses definition in three ways: definition is closely related to cause in the *Posterior Analytics*; it is one of the predicables in the *Topics*; it is one of the places of the demonstrative enthymeme in the *Rhetoric*. Remnants of these meanings survive in Cicero's use of it only as a place, for Cicero distinguishes two kinds of definitions, one of things that are (*res quae sunt*), the other of things that are understood (*res quae intelliguntur*).⁶⁷ Cicero's enumeration of intrinsic place begins with definition; contraries is the ninth and contradictions the thirteenth place; indeed definition is the place of intrinsic places. Aristotle's enumeration of places of confirmatory and refutative enthymemes begins with opposites; defini-

⁶⁴ Ibid. 2. 8.

⁶⁵ Ibid. 3. 11.

⁶⁶ Ibid. 18. 71.

⁶⁷ Ibid. 5. 27.

tion is the seventh place. The places of conjugate things in Cicero's list run through words, genera and species of things, and comparisons which take three forms, induction, collation, and example. In the seventh place of adjuncts which follow from an argument Cicero introduces temporal distinctions of what happened before the thing, with the thing, and after the thing (*ante rem, cum re, post rem*) which were to alter profoundly the statement of philosophical problems. They enter into the distinction of the next three places, consequences, antecedents, and contradictions, which provide necessary and universal connections. In conjectural or factual connections coexistents take the place of contradictories. Unlike the other adjuncts considered up to this point, which are not found in every discourse, these connections are always present, for a consequent is what necessarily follows a thing, and antecedents and contradictories have a like necessary relation with it. This place is the particular domain of dialecticians. It is a single place of discovering arguments, but the mode of treatment in discovering consequents, antecedents, and contradictories is threefold, and dialecticians call them three modes of conclusions. The Aristotelian art of topic is conjoined with the Stoic science of dialectic in this topic which is the place of discovery of syllogisms, and the syllogisms discovered are therefore not Aristotelian analytical syllogisms but Stoic indemonstrable syllogisms. Modern scholars have been able to reconstruct some notion of Stoic dialectic from the testimony of Cicero, an Academic, and Sextus Empiricus, a Skeptic. Cicero presents seven syllogisms. The first three are hypothetical dialectical syllogisms. Cicero compares them with the modes of discourse of jurists, orators, and philosophers, and with the enthymemes of rhetoric. The fourth and the fifth are disjunctive dialectical syllogisms, which likewise are like the places of other modes of discourse. The final two are truth tables based on denying the possibility of conjoining two statements. Cicero concludes this topic with the observation that from these modes of argument innumerable conclusions arise (*nascuntur*) and almost the whole of *dialektike* consists in developing these sequences.⁶⁸

Aristotle's four causes do not depend on distinctions of time, before and after; but the analysis of causation since Cicero's formulation of the places of before and after, depends on time sequences, in which causes are separated from effects and all causes are efficient

⁶⁸ Ibid. 12–14. 53–57.

causes. The place of efficient things (*res efficiens*), which are called causes, and the place of things effected (*res effecta*) by those efficient causes (*efficiens causa*) provide the framework for the distinctions and vocabulary for modern philosophical discussions of causation—efficient causes, causes and effect, cause and fate, endless sequences of causes, necessary, circumstantial, and sufficient causes. There are two kinds of causes, one which is efficient with certainty and by its own force (*vis*) of the effect that depends on that force, as fire burns, another which does not have the nature of producing an effect but without which the effect cannot be produced, as place, time, matter, and instruments, and still others which furnish preparation for producing something, as meeting prepares for love, and love for crime. Cicero adds that from this kind of causes following one another from eternity fate was woven by the Stoics.⁶⁹ Cicero sums up his discussion of causes by relating “cause” as a common place of proof to “cause” as an issue of discussion: “The whole place of *causes* having been explained, a great abundance (*copia*) of arguments is supplied from their variety at least for the great *causes* of orators and philosophers and in your causes [those of jurists] if they are not more numerous, they are perhaps more subtle.”⁷⁰

The Greek Aristotelian tradition was developed in glosses, paraphrases, and commentaries on his works in which the methods of Aristotle were explained by reduction to one of the Academic, Platonic, or Neoplatonic forms of universal dialectic. Porphyry (ca. 233–305 A.D.), editor and disciple of Plotinus, made this reduction briefly and expeditiously in a work which was to color the interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy in the West more than anything that Aristotle himself wrote, the *Introduction to the Categories of Aristotle*. Porphyry thought that an introduction was needed to the categories, or *predicaments*, from which propositions and syllogisms are formed, which would explain the nature of predication. He found such an explanation of predicaments and predicates in the *predicables* by which Aristotle develops dialectic in the *Topics*. For Aristotle dialectic is reasoning from commonly accepted opinions as contrasted to demonstrative reasoning based on true and primary premises concerning the causes of things, which is treated in the *Posterior Analytics*. The analysis of demonstrative syllogisms is by causes

⁶⁹ Ibid. 15. 58–59.

⁷⁰ Ibid. 17. 65.

used in proof; the analysis of dialectical syllogisms is by positions which express opinions. Aristotle uses four predicables—accident, genus, property, and definition—to classify dialectical propositions according to the ways in which predicates are related to subjects in the statement of opinions.⁷¹ Aristotle does not use the predicables to differentiate the categories; on the contrary, once he has distinguished the predicables he uses the categories to explain their uses.⁷² Aristotle's four predicables become Porphyry's five "words"—genus, difference, species, property, and accident—by the substitution of "difference" and "species" for "definition." Porphyry notes at once that he will limit his discussion to logical questions and omit the "more profound questions" about genera and species—whether they subsist as things, or only as conceptions, and whether if subsistent, they are bodily or incorporeal, and whether they are in sensibles or apart from them. The four predicables of Aristotle can be distinguished from each other in logical terms, but the differentiations of genera and species require reference beyond logical terms to the things they designate, and the status of the terms themselves as things or thoughts, corporeal or incorporeal, sensibles or intelligibles comes into question to constitute the "problem of the universal." The compelling force of the change led to the addition of a sixth predicable—by Avicenna in the eleventh and Abailard in the twelfth century, independently of one another—"individual," which was necessary to give the hierarchies of Porphyry's tree a ground. Having added "individual" to the list of predicables, Abailard added a fourth to Porphyry's three questions about universals, whether the reality of universals depends on their existing in individuals. The addition of "individual" also prepared the way for the common textbook un-Aristotelian example of an Aristotelian syllogism, formed by substituting an individual for a particular, "All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal." After Porphyry's *Introduction* the Neoplatonizing Aristotelian tradition abandoned the distinction between demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms, for dialectic ceased to be a method of opinions to become a method of primary and true principles of things and thoughts, and the dialectical inductive and deductive methods became scientific methods. The

⁷¹ Aristotle *Topics* 1. 4–6. 101b38–103a5.

⁷² *Ibid.* 1. 9. 103b20–104a2.

Aristotelian philosophy was frozen in hierarchies of being and thought stretched from sensible individuals to transcendent Ideas and the One.

The period of the development of Neoplatonism was also the period of the Second Sophistic, and the Aristotelian tradition was Platonized in Sophistic paraphrase as well as in transcendental dialectic. Themistius (ca. 317–388 A.D.) was reputed to have been the greatest orator of his time. He opened a school and served in high offices under a succession of emperors from Constantius II to Theodosius I, who appointed him prefect of the city of Constantinople and tutor of his son, the future emperor Arcadius. Himself a pagan, he continued in high favor under Christian emperors before and after Julian, and he advised Julian concerning reforms in education that would return the Roman empire to a firm base on ancient Greek culture and literature but without engaging, as did Neoplatonists and Sophists of the time, in polemics against Christianity. He was convinced that philosophy should not be a technically erudite or mystically esoteric pursuit, but should be addressed to the people to establish their community and form their lives. Consequently many of his thirty-four orations, for the most part official addresses to Emperors, are concerned with philosophy and its relation to dialectic, rhetoric, and sophistry. He seeks the touchstone of the true philosopher in *Oration 21*, building on Plato's description of the sham philosopher in the *Republic* and disavows all pretension to be a philosopher, adducing in evidence the Sophist robe and the theatre in which he speaks and the applause he seeks. Some of his paraphrases of works of Aristotle survive. In them he seeks to improve the literary style and to relate the presentation to contemporary problems and modes of thought. The Greek original of his *Paraphrases* on the *Posterior Analytics*, the *Physics*, and the *De anima* survive, and Hebrew translations of an Arabic version of the *De caelo* and book lambda of the *Metaphysics*. His *Paraphrase* of the *Topics* does not exist in the original or in translation, but Boethius gives a full exposition of it and compares it step by step with the *Topics* of Cicero in Latin, and Averroes' use of it in his commentaries on the *Topics* indicates that it had been translated into Arabic.

Boethius (ca. 489–524 A.D.) held high office in the Western Empire, as Themistius had in the East. He gave form to the Aristotelian tradition in the West by bringing together the Academic Aristotle of Cicero who had taken his place in a context of the liberal arts presented by Varro, Apuleius, Macrobius, and Martianus Ca-

PELLA, a sample of the Neoplatonic Aristotle in Porphyry's *Introduction* to the *Categories* and a sample of the Sophistic Aristotle in Themistius's *Paraphrase* of the *Topics*. It is an Aristotle of words—the ten words of the categories and the five words of the predicables joined together in Aristotelian propositions, Peripatetic and Stoic syllogisms and rhetorical enthymemes, and related to things and the knowledge of things by skeptical, realistic, transcendental, and sophistical dialectics. Boethius translated Porphyry's *Introduction* and wrote two commentaries on it. He translated Aristotle's *Categories* and *On Interpretation* and wrote interpretations of them. In *On Topical Differences* he also refers to his translations of the *Prior Analytics* and the *Topics*, but the translation of the *Categories* and the *On Interpretation* are the only two works of Aristotle which seem to have been solidly influential in the formation of the tradition of Aristotle in the West. Boethius wrote treatises *On the Categorical Syllogism*, *On the Hypothetical Syllogism*, and *On Division*. He wrote a *Commentary on Cicero's Topics*, *On Topical Differences*, and he is reputed to have written a *Commentary on Aristotle's Topics* which is now lost.

Boethius's *On Topical Differences* is a comparison and combination of Cicero's and Themistius's *Topics*, which he calls dialectical topics, followed by a like examination of the differences of the topics of rhetoric based on Cicero's *De inventione*. The first book is devoted to explaining basic terms and distinctions, selected from the eight books of Aristotle's *Topics*, which he translated, and the seven books of Cicero's *Topics*, like proposition, statement, conclusion, topic, question, and argument. Something of the stress of relating the two traditions of topics appears in the opening line of the treatise in which Cicero's statement of the nature of the art of discourse is modified to accommodate Themistius. Every method of discourse (*ratio disserendi*), which the ancient peripatetics call *logike*, is divided into two parts, one of discovering, the other of judging. The part which purges and instructs judgment, called *analytike*, we can call resolutory (*resolutoria*, the word used in medieval Latin translations of the *Prior* and the *Posterior Analytics*). The part which furnishes the faculty of discovering, called *topike* by the Greeks, is called local by us.⁷³ Cicero had reduced the method of analytic and metaphysics

⁷³ Boethius *De differentiis topicis* 1, PL 44. 1173B.

to dialectic. Themistius wrote paraphrases on the *Posterior Analytics* and book lambda of the *Metaphysics*. Moreover, necessary first principles are retained among the kinds of propositions, but they are given a name constructed from that of one of the kinds of rhetorical arguments which Aristotle distinguished in the second book of the *Rhetoric*. A “maxim” is a general statement about questions of practical conduct. A “maximal or principal proposition” is a proposition *per se nota* and in need of no proof. Its scope is broadened to include theoretical as well as practical questions. Boethius’s example of a maximal proposition is, if equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal.⁷⁴

Book 2 of *On Topical Differences*, which expounds Themistius’s topics, likewise begins by explaining the distinction that arose in Cicero’s art of discourse between argumentation and argument: “*Argumentation* is the explication of an *argument* by speech (*oratio*).”⁷⁵ There are two kinds of argumentation, syllogism and induction, and all forms of argumentation derive their force from the syllogism which is the maximal source of conviction (*fides*) as was shown in his translation of Aristotle’s *Prior Analytics*. The definition of a topic is also Cicero’s: it is the seat of an argument. The seat of an argument can be understood partly as a maximal proposition, and partly as the difference or differentia of a maximal proposition. There are two kinds of maximal propositions, principal and maximal propositions which are known *per se*, and have nothing more fundamental by which they are demonstrated, and other principal and maximal propositions for which the first and maximal propositions supply conviction or belief. An argument produces conviction or belief about something in doubt and should be better known and more believable than what is proved, and therefore maximal propositions *per se nota* without need of alien proof must be the source of conviction of all arguments. Such a proposition is sometimes contained within the ambit of an argument, and sometimes supplies force and affects things outside the argument. In one way a topic, a seat of an argument, is said to be a maximal and principal proposition supplying belief to other propositions; in another way the differentiae of maximal propositions are called topics and they are drawn from the terms of the question. Themistius analyzes these topics as Aristotle did by analyzing the

⁷⁴ Ibid. 1176C.

⁷⁵ Ibid. 1183A.

relation of subject and predicates, and the predicables Themistius uses are Aristotle's four. There are three kinds of topics which are differentiae of maximal propositions: (1) internal, drawn from the terms of the question, like substance, definition, descriptions, consequence; (2) external, applied from without, like judgment, similarity, opposition, proportion; and (3) intermediate between the two, as arguments drawn from grammatical cases, as from "justly" to "just things," is midway between arguments drawn from the thing in question and arguments drawn from external distinctions imposed on it.

Book 3 on the topics of Cicero, begins by explaining how Boethius plans to treat the differentiae of places in multiple and various ways, and begins again with Cicero's statement of the two parts of the *logical faculty*, discovering and judging, stated in slightly different terms. As stated in introducing Themistius's division in which topics are found in the relation of predicates to subjects in the manner of Aristotle's *Topics*, there are three kinds of places: those intrinsic to the terms of the question, extrinsic places imposed on the question from without, and intermediate places arising partly from the question and partly from the way in which it is treated. As stated in introducing Cicero's division, in which topics are found in the relation of what is said to what it is about, in the manner of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, there are two kinds of places, intrinsic places which contain an argument, Aristotle's entechanical arguments, and extrinsic places which do not contain an argument, Aristotle's atechanical arguments. At the end of book 3 Boethius compares the two divisions beginning with the differentiae of the whole division. Themistius's division was a tripartite division into intrinsic places which are present in the terms of the question considered, extrinsic places which are assumed, and places which operate between the two. Cicero's division is twofold into those which inhere in the matter at issue and those acquired extrinsically. All of Themistius's intermediate places form part of Cicero's list of places inherent in the matter under discussion.⁷⁶ The treatment of topics by their differentiae fits Cicero's topics of discourse better than Themistius's topics of things, thoughts, and word. Boethius is therefore able to close his statement of each Ciceronian place by indicating its maximal proposition and its differentia. Thus definition is defined as speech (*oratio*) which designates the being (*esse*) of any thing, and the description of how an

⁷⁶ Ibid. 3. 1200C–D.

argument is drawn from definition closes with the specification that the question is about genus, the maximal proposition is, where the definition is absent, there what is defined is also absent, and the topic is *from definition*.⁷⁷

The final book about rhetorical topics also shows the tension of combining the two classifications of topics, for in Cicero's analysis of the arts of discourse, since all discourses consist of topic and dialectic, dialectic is not itself an art of discourse and unlike rhetoric it has no places. Rhetorical places have to do with the issues of cases and are derived from persons (*persona*) and what they do (*negotia*).⁷⁸ To make them rhetorical Boethius introduces "circumstances." Circumstances are things which coming together produce the substance of the question. There are seven circumstances, the first, who did it, and its eleven subdivisions, are circumstances of the person, and the remaining six, what, why, how, where, when, with what means, are circumstances of the action. Cicero's topics of persons and actions can be arranged according to circumstances, one from persons and five from actions,⁷⁹ but Cicero does not call them "circumstances" in either the *De inventione* or the *Topics*. Boethius borrowed circumstances from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* where Aristotle argues that knowledge of circumstances is essential to voluntary action.⁸⁰ When Thomas Aquinas treats the circumstances of human action he cites Cicero as the source of the seven circumstances contained in the verse, "*quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando*." He says that Aristotle adds one to that list, "*circa quid*" which Cicero includes under "*quid*."⁸¹

The materials which Boethius assembled to form the basis for the tradition of Aristotle in the West were not homogeneous and coherent, but they had the more important characteristic of containing within them problems and incoherencies which made them the source of ongoing inquiry, acceptance, and rejection. Boethius placed them in a context which contributed to this vitality. He wrote theological treatises in which he remained faithful to the doctrines of Augustine, but used the categories and the sciences of Aristotle to

⁷⁷ Ibid. 1196C.

⁷⁸ Ibid. 4. 1212A.

⁷⁹ Cicero *De inventione* 1. 24. 34 and 38.

⁸⁰ Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 3. 1. 1111a1–8.

⁸¹ Thomas Aquinas *Summa Theologiae* 1a2ae. 7. 3.

reexpress them; he compiled an *Institutio arithmetica* and an *Institutio musica* which, together with a treatise on geometry attributed to him, placed the arts of the trivium in the context of the quadrivium; he wrote a *Consolation of Philosophy* which treated the problems of the relation of theoretical to practical philosophy in a form which combined literature, prose and verse, autobiography, philosophy and theology in the later traditions of literature and speculation. He combined an Academic Aristotle, who taught the West to discuss invention and discovery, a Neoplatonic Aristotle who provided philosophical hierarchies for theology, and a Sophistic Aristotle who related philosophy to action and to literature. When the works of Aristotle and his Greek and Arabic commentators became available in Latin in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, they were not items of erudition but sources of new methods and new matters. The Aristotle of the topics of discovery and proof united with the Aristotle of sciences and methods to produce the beginnings of modern science, modern literature, modern philosophy, and modern constitutions. It also prepared for critical editions of Aristotle's works and translations into modern languages in which the variety of Platonic tinges which Boethius fixed on our knowledge of Aristotle continued to dominate the interpretation and use of his philosophy.

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